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1 Motivation
Globally usable cryptocurrencies are on the rise. 10 years after the introduc-
tion of Bitcoin, Facebook is seeking to launch Libra designed to appeal to its
more than 2 billion world-wide members. Other companies are not far behind.
While other means of payments have been in worldwide use before, the ease
of use and the scope of these new cryptocurrencies are about to create global
currencies of an altogether different quality. How will they alter the finan-
cial landscape? How will this affect exchange rates and monetary policies of
traditional currencies? We shall argue: considerably so.
Global currencies are not a new phenomenon. The Spanish Dollar in the
17th and 18th century, gold during the gold standard period, the Pound Ster-
ling prior to 1944 and the U.S. Dollar since then may provide prior examples,
and often served as an internationally accepted unit of account. The new
cryptocurrencies, however, seek to become a means of payment, thus directly
competing with national currencies for transaction purposes. We argue that
this feature together with the consequences for national monetary policies is an
entirely new phenomenon: in any case, this phenomenon and its consequences
certainly deserves proper analysis. This is our aim.
We analyze a two-country economy featuring a home, a foreign and a global
(crypto)currency. We adopt a general framework and assume that these cur-
rencies provide liquidity services. We show in section 7 that this framework
encompasses a number of standard approaches in the monetary economics lit-
erature. For the benchmark case that markets are complete, that liquidity
services are rendered immediately and that the global currency is used in both
countries, we show that nominal interest rates must be equal and that the
exchange rate between the home and the foreign currency is a risk-adjusted
martingale, see proposition 4.1. We call this phenomenon a crypto-enforced
monetary policy synchronization (CEMPS). The home central bank, say, may
seek to regain independence from this forced synchronization by moving inter-
est rates down or up relative to the foreign interest rate. In the first case, it
risks being trapped in too low-interest-rate policies, approaching the zero lower
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bound. In the second case, it risks that its own national currency is abandoned
as a medium of exchange. If the global currency is backed by interest-bearing
assets, additional and tight restrictions on monetary policy arise, see section 6.
In particular, the central bank may be forced to the zero lower bound, when
the global currency consortium seeks to keep its currency in use per selecting
appropriately low and competitive fees.
Our results can be understood as a strengthened version of the Mundell-
Fleming Trilemma (Fleming, 1962; Mundell, 1963) or Impossible Trinity. Ac-
cording to this cornerstone result in international economics, it is impossible
to ensure a fixed exchange rate, free capital flows and an independent mon-
etary policy, all at the same time. In our framework, we allow the exchange
rate to be flexible and assume free capital flows: nevertheless, monetary pol-
icy becomes perfectly synchronized. More broadly, our results reach the same
conclusions as Rey (2015) that the trilemma is transformed into a 'dilemma'
or an 'irreconcilable` duo. While the global financial cycle is the culprit in her
analysis, it is the worldwide diffusion of a global currency in ours.
1.1 Literature
Our analysis adds to the literature on the implications of currency competition
for exchange rates and monetary policy. We provide a general framework based
on asset-pricing considerations, which can nest classical monetary models used
in the open-economy literature, like those presented in Obstfeld and Rogoff
(1996), adding a global currency and assuming complete markets.
Our paper is related but complementary to the literature on the interna-
tionalization of currency and vehicle currencies from the perspective of cur-
rency substitution. Our result can be read as a sharp contrast to Obstfeld
and Rogoff (2002), who argue that international monetary policy coordination
is of minor importance compared to national considerations: in our frame-
work, the introduction of a global currency leaves the central bank with little
or only unattractive choices. Krugman (1979), Goldberg and Tille (2008)
and Rey (2001) study a three country, three currency foreign exchange model
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where transaction costs may give rise to a 'vehicle currency', i.e. the usage
of the third country's currency to avoid direct foreign exchange between two
countries. Here, instead, a third, global currency acts as substitute for either
country's currency, thus allowing for currency competition on the local level.
Therefore, currencies can be abandoned here despite symmetry in liquidity
services. Further, the main focus of our analysis is on the implications for
monetary policy of competing currencies. Like us, Casas et al. (2016) examine
the impact of a global or dominant currency. In contrast to us, they focus
on exchange rate pass-through under stickiness of prices, while we focus on
the usage of a currency as a means of payment. We thus view our research
as complementary to theirs. Benigno (2019) focuses on a one-country model
and shows that under competition to cryptocurrencies, the central bank can
face some bounds on interest rate and inflation if government currency has
to retain some role as medium of exchange. We differ from his analysis by
analyzing the consequence of cryptocurrency competition for the international
monetary system by building on a general stochastic framework.
There is a large body of the literature which focuses on monetary pol-
icy under currency competition while abstracting from competition between
interest-bearing assets (bonds) and currency. A classic contribution is Kareken
and Wallace (1981) and its stochastic version Manuelli and Peck (1990). Gar-
ratt and Wallace (2018) provide an extension to cryptocurrencies. Schilling
and Uhlig (2018) focus on implications of competition between a cryptocur-
rency and traditional fiat money for the price evolution of the cryptocurrency
and for monetary policy. Schilling and Uhlig (2019) analyze implications of
goods-specific transaction costs for currency substitution. Here, instead, the
nominal interest rates are decisive for currency substitution due to competi-
tion between bonds and currencies. Fernández-Villaverde and Sanches (2016)
analyze currency competition and monetary policy in a Lagos-Wright model.
Our framework is considerably more general than all these contributions, al-
lowing interest-bearing bonds and encompassing a number of monetary mod-
els. Like us, Brunnermeier and Niepelt (2019) pursues the implications of the
equivalence between private and public money, though our emphasis is on the
4
international context and has a different focus. Our analysis in section 6 shares
common themes and conclusions with Marimon et al. (2003), who likewise em-
phasize that cheap inside monies place tight upper bounds on inflation rates
there or nominal interest rates here.
2 A simple framework
This section uses a simple framework with a minimalist and non-stochastic
structure to provide intuition and to preview the main results.
There are two countries, home and foreign, and three currencies: currency
h and f of their respective countries and a global (crypto) currency g. While
currency h can be used for transactions only in country h and the currency f
only in country f , the global currency can be used in both countries. Money,
either in a physical or digital form, provides non-pecuniary benefits, which we
call liquidity services and yield liquidity premia. Let us assume that the two
currencies are perfect substitutes in providing liquidity services and that these
services are delivered at the same time in which money is held.1
Let St be the exchange rate between currency h and f in date t, i.e. the
amount of currency h needed to buy one unit of currency f . Let Qt denote the
amount of currency h needed to buy one unit of the global (crypto) currency.
Likewise, let Q∗t the amount of currency f needed to buy one unit of the global
(crypto) currency. Therefore,
Qt = StQ
∗
t (1)
At a generic time t, a resident in country h can acquire Mh,t units in currency
h and Mg,t units in the global currency at the exchange rate Qt implying an
1In a non-stochastic economy, it does not matter whether the liquidity services for holding
money in t are provided at time t or at time t+1. As it will be shown in the next sections and
in Appendix B.1, results in the stochastic economy are different and specific to the timing of
liquidity services. The assumption of perfect substitutability between the currencies is stark
and chosen to provide clear-cut results. The generalization to imperfect substitutability is
discussed in Appendix C.
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overall expenditure or total money holding
Mtoth,t = Mh,t +QtMg,t, (2)
expressed in units of the domestic currency. Note that we are assuming per-
fect substitutability here and in the main text: the extension to imperfect
substitutability is taken up in Appendix C. Since liquidity services are de-
livered immediately in t, the investor in country h receives non-pecuniary
benefits from the overall money expenditure Mtoth,t deflated by the price of
some generic consumption good (either tradeable or non-tradeable) for which
money is exchanged for. At time t+ 1, the two monies deliver an overall pay-
off Mh,t +Qt+1Mg,t, in units of the domestic currency. Since liquidity services
provided by each currency are substitutes, the amount of services received is in-
dependent of the portfolio choice. Only if the returns on money are equal, then
agents are willing to hold both currencies in their portfolio. This is equivalent
to saying that the exchange rate Q should be constant, Qt+1 = Qt. Otherwise,
one currency would dominate the other as a means of payment. This result is
nothing more than a restatement of Kareken and Wallace (1981), additionally
allowing the monies to provide liquidity services. The analysis can equivalently
be applied to country f to obtain that the exchange rate Q∗ should also be
constant.
Our first result in the paper follows directly from the above analysis: when
a global currency is used in both local markets, the exchange rate, S, between
currency h and f has to be constant too although h and f do not compete di-
rectly since h and f are not simultaneously accepted in the same local market.
The monies h and f , however, compete indirectly through the global currency
g which has worldwide acceptance, by this creating a link between the two
local currencies. This indirect competition then enforces equal returns on h
and f . To see this result, use the constancy of Q and Q∗ into (1).
Our second result states that simultaneous trade in a global and local cur-
rencies requires synchronization of monetary policies across countries, i.e the
nominal interest rates are equalized across countries. To see this result, allow
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Country f
Q*t Qt
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Lt
L*t
GLOBAL
t t+1
t+2
1+it
1+i*t
BOND
Figure 1: International trade and money flow in time
investors in each country to trade also in two nominal bonds denominated in
currency h and f , respectively. In a non-stochastic economy, with frictionless
capital markets, uncovered interest rate parity holds
1 + it
1 + i∗t
=
St+1
St
(3)
in which it and i
∗
t denote respectively the nominal interest rate in country h and
f from period t to t + 1 on one-period bonds denominated in the respective
currencies. Since the exchange rate S is constant, interest rates should be
equal. Figure 1 summarizes the key relationship between interest rates and
exchange rates.
As the next section will show, the result of equal nominal interest rates
extends unchanged to a stochastic economy in the case liquidity services of
money are delivered at the same time money is held in the portfolio. The
result of constant exchange rates generalizes to a stochastic economy with
the qualification that the exchange rate between currency h and f follows
instead a martingale in the risk-neutral measure. In the stochastic setting,
we will further show the equalization of the liquidity premia of money across
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countries.2
3 A general framework
We present our main results through a general framework relying only on asset-
pricing considerations, in a stochastic multi-period economy. Our structure is
broad enough to encompass a large variety of models.3 Both agents can trade
either bond and can hold the global currency. The agent in country h can in
addition hold currency h but not currency f . Vice versa, the agent in country
f can hold currency f but cannot trade currency h.
A key assumption for obtaining our result is that markets are complete,
arbitrage-free and frictionless. As a consequence, a stochastic discount factor
exists and is unique. LetMt+1 denote the nominal stochastic discount factor
in units of currency h for the agent in country h, and let likewiseM∗t+1 denote
the nominal stochastic discount factor in units of currency f for the agent in
country f . An implication of complete markets is that the nominal discount
factors in units of the two local currencies are connected through their exchange
rate since they are equalized once expressed in the same unit of account.4
Assumption 3.1 (Complete Markets:).
Mt+1 =M∗t+1
St
St+1
. (4)
2 Liquidity premia are in general monotone in the opportunity cost of holding money,
i.e. the interest rate. Equal interest rates directly imply equal liquidity premia.
3The framework applies to one or multi-good exchange or production economies. Thus,
we do not pin down these features specifically. Agents may live for two periods in an
OLG model or be infinitively lived. In Section 7 we map our general framework into specific
examples drawn from classical monetary models in which we specify preferences, constraints
and maximization problem. These classical monetary models have been examined in a large
body of literature, including existence of equilibria and their properties: for these reasons,
we can sidestep these issues here.
Time is discrete and there is uncertainty. The economy does feature the same two coun-
tries as introduced in previous section, and at least the same three currencies and two
nominal bonds.
4For the generality of this result see Obstfeld (2007).
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Consider a (non-monetary) asset offering a (possibly random) nominal re-
turn Rt+1 in currency h. Since returns have a price of one (Cochrane, 2009),
standard asset pricing considerations imply, that the stochastic discount fac-
tor,Mt+1, and return, Rt+1, are such that
1 = Et[Mt+1Rt+1]. (5)
Thus, since a nominal one-period bond in country h pays the return Rt+1 =
1 + it,
1
1 + it
= Et[Mt+1] (6)
and likewise for the bond in country f
1
1 + i∗t
= Et[M∗t+1]. (7)
While nonmonetary assets are used for the intertemporal transfer of re-
sources, money offers some liquidity services above and beyond the intertem-
poral transfer. We shall therefore assume that currency h as well as the global
currency pays a non-monetary liquidity service Lt to agents in country h per
unit of currency, in addition to the intertemporal payoff. Likewise, we assume
that currency f pays a liquidity premium L∗t to agents in country f per unit
of currency. For clarity and simplicity, we here assume that currency h and g
in country h as well as currency f and g in country g are perfect substitutes,
postponing the generalization and discussion of imperfect substitutability to
Appendix C.
In a full model specification such as given in Section 7, these liquidity
services are endogenously determined by the optimal consumption choices of
households. In all of these models, money is held across periods from t to
t + 1, and the particular model structure determines, whether the services
are rendered in period t (immediately) or in t + 1 (with delay). For the
benchmark case here, we assume the former, but return to the later in the
Appendix B.1.
Assumption 3.2 (Liquidity immediacy). The purchase of currency h and g
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in country h at t yields an immediate liquidity premium Lt receivable in t.
Analogously, the time t purchase of currency f and g in country f at t yields
an immediate liquidity premium L∗t receivable in t.
The date-t (post-liquidity) price of a unit of currency h, expressed in units
of the same currency equals unity, by definition. Standard asset pricing con-
siderations then deliver
1 ≥ Lt + Et[Mt+1]. (8)
Whenever (8) holds with equality, agents in country h are willing to accept
currency h at its unitary price, since they are exactly compensated by the
liquidity premium plus the discounted future value of the payoff, which are
both terms on the right hand side of equation (8). In case of a strict inequality,
the current price of currency h is too high compared to expectations on future
price development such that agents are not willing to hold the currency. Note
that we do not allow short sale.
Likewise, for a unit of the global (or crypto) currency, trading at a price of
Qt in terms of units of currency h, we obtain
Qt ≥ LtQt + Et[Mt+1Qt+1], (9)
where this equation holds with equality, if the global currency is used in coun-
try h, i.e. if agents are compensated for the price Qt of a global currency
exactly by the liquidity premium plus the discounted future value of the pay-
off, on the right hand side of equation (9). The price cannot be lower than the
right hand side, since otherwise agents in country h would seek to acquire the
currency and bid up its value. The price can be higher, however, if the global
currency is not used in country h. We implicitly rule out short sales or, more
precisely, rule out that short-sold currencies render negative liquidity premia.
Combining (6) and (8), we obtain
it
1 + it
≥ Lt, (10)
which holds with equality when currency h is used and therefore describes
10
a monotone relationship between the nominal interest rate and the liquidity
services. For the foreign country, we likewise obtain
1 ≥ L∗t + Et[M∗t+1] (11)
Q∗t ≥ L∗tQ∗t + Et[M∗t+1Q∗t+1], (12)
i∗t
1 + i∗t
≥ L∗t . (13)
In the analysis that follows we stick to the following assumptions.
Assumption 3.3 (Nonnegative liquidity premia). The liquidity premia are
non-negative, i.e. Lt ≥ 0 and L∗t ≥ 0.
This assumption together with equations (10) and (13) implies that it ≥ 0
and i∗t ≥ 0, i.e. imply a zero lower bound for nominal interest rates. Moreover,
we assume that at least one currency is used in each country while bonds
cannot serve as medium of exchange.
Assumption 3.4 (Currency usage). In country h, at least one of (8) and (9)
holds with equality. In country f , at least one of (11) and (12) holds with
equality.
Additionally, it is reasonable to impose that at least one of (9) or (12)
holds with equality, but we are not making use of that restriction. We make
the assumption that the global currency has a positive value in the time period
t under consideration.
Assumption 3.5 (Global currency is valued).
Qt > 0 and Q
∗
t > 0 (14)
Given the triangular relationship among exchange rates, Q = SQ∗, it fol-
lows that Q > 0 if and only if Q∗ > 0. Thus, the currency being valued in one
country necessarily spills over to the other country.
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4 Main Results
Some additional terminology shall prove useful. For a generic random variable
Xt+1, define risk adjusted expectation E˜t[Xt+1] in country h as
E˜t[Xt+1] ≡ Et[Mt+1Xt+1]
Et[Mt+1] , (15)
and the risk adjusted expectation E˜∗t [Xt+1] in country f as
E˜∗t [Xt+1] ≡
Et[M∗t+1Xt+1]
Et[M∗t+1]
. (16)
We now obtain our main result.
Proposition 4.1 (Stochastic Economy under Liquidity Immediacy)
In a stochastic economy, under the assumption of liquidity immediacy, com-
plete markets, and the global currency being valued. If all currencies are used
in both countries, i.e. if equations (9), (12) and (8), (11) hold with equality,
then
i) the nominal interest rates are equalized it = i
∗
t ;
ii) the liquidity premia are equal Lt = L
∗
t ;
iii) the nominal exchange rate St between currency h and f follows a martin-
gale, using risk adjusted expectations of country h;
iv) the nominal exchange rate S∗t = 1/St between currency f and h follows a
martingale, using risk adjusted expectations of country f ;
Proof. [Proposition 4.1] The competition between currency h and the global
currency, i.e. (8) and (9) with equality, the complete-market assumption (4)
and finally the competition between currency f and global currency, i.e. (11)
and (12) with equality, deliver
Et[Mt+1] = Et
[
Mt+1 Qt+1
Qt
]
= Et
[
M∗t+1
Q∗t+1
Q∗t
]
= Et[M∗t+1]
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Equations (8) and (11) now imply Lt = L
∗
t and thus it = i
∗
t , per equations (10)
and (13). Exploit the equality (17) and use the complete market assumption
(4) to obtain
Et[Mt+1] = Et
[
Mt+1St+1
St
]
(17)
implying the country-h risk adjusted martingale property for the exchange
rate,
St = E˜[St+1].
Proceeding instead per replacing Mt+1 on the left hand side of (17) with
M∗t+1St/St+1 implies the country-f risk adjusted martingale property for S∗t =
1/St,
S∗t = E˜
∗[S∗t+1].
Proposition 4.1 says that, with complete markets, global usage of the global
currency, and simultaneous usage of local currency, monetary policies must be
perfectly synchronized: their nominal interest rates must be equal. This result,
which we call Crypto-Enforced Monetary Policy Synchronization (CEMPS),
constitutes a constraint on the impossible trinity. Under free capital flows and
without a global currency, uncovered interest parity and the classic Impossible
Trinity result provides the home central bank with a choice: it can either give
up on a pegged exchange rate or the independence of monetary policy. Our
result shows that adding a global currency implies a further restriction, when
it becomes a perfect substitute of the local currencies. Now, the monetary
policy of the central banks can no longer be independent. Additionally, the
exchange rate is now a risk-adjusted martingale and not necessarily a peg. The
classical Impossible Trinity thus becomes even less reconcilable.
It is instructive to examine the special case of a non-stochastic economy as a
benchmark. The following corollary immediately follows from Proposition 4.1.
It is a version of the celebrated result in Kareken and Wallace (1981).
Corollary 4.1 (Deterministic Economy under Liquidity Immediacy)
In a deterministic economy, under the assumption of liquidity immediacy, com-
plete markets, the global currency being valued and global currency usage, the
13
nominal exchange rate St between currency h and f is constant, St ≡ S¯.
Proof. Immediate.
With currency substitution, the countries' nominal interest rates are equal-
ized independently of whether the economy is stochastic or deterministic. How-
ever, the result of constant exchange rate in the deterministic case is replaced
by the martingale behavior of the stochastic economy. Still in this case it is
possible to say something on the probability of deviations from a constant
exchange rate by exploiting the Markov inequality, i.e. that any nonnegative
random variable X satisfies
P (X ≥ a) ≤ E[X]
a
for any a > 0. As is well known, this bound is sharp only, if X has point
masses at either zero or at a. The argument is applied to the change of the
exchange rate X = St+1/St and the result may be useful for bounding the
probabilities of extreme events in a distribution-free manner.
Proposition 4.2 (Deviations)
For any K > −1, the percentage deviation from constancy of the nominal
exchange rate satisfies
Pt
(
St−1
St
− 1 > K
)
≤ 1 + (1 + it)σt|M σt|S/S
K + 1
(18)
Proof. [Proposition 4.2] Proof in Appendix A.
Since K is allowed to be negative, the likelihood that St−1
St
drops below one
can be estimated as well.
4.1 Regaining monetary policy independence
Revisiting the result from Proposition 4.1, does this mean that the central
banks in the two countries have no choice but to accept this fate of coordinated
monetary policy? Or can, country h deviate from the monetary policy in
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country f , and if so, in which direction? Proposition 4.1 can also be read the
other way around. If it 6= i∗t , then either the global currency is not used in at
least one country or one of the national currencies is not in use or both. The
central bank in country h may then contemplate pursuing a policy that makes
sure that the global currency is not used in country h, i.e. that (9) remains
an inequality.
Proposition 4.3 (Escaping global currency adoption)
In a stochastic economy, under the assumption of liquidity immediacy, com-
plete markets, and the global currency being valued. Assume that both local
currencies are used in their corresponding countries, i.e. equations (8) and
(11) hold with equality. Independently of whether the global currency is used
or not in country f , if it < i
∗
t , then
i) the global currency is not adopted in country h;
ii) the liquidity premia satisfy Lt < L
∗
t ;
iii) the nominal exchange rate St between currency h and f follows a super-
martingale, using risk adjusted expectations in country h;
iv) the nominal exchange rate S∗t = 1/St between currency f and h follows a
submartingale, using risk adjusted expectations in country f ;
Proof. [Proposition 4.3] Proof in Appendix A.
To understand the economics behind this result, it is important to acknowl-
edge not only the competition between the currency h respectively f and the
global currency but also the countrywise competition between the bond and
currency and the role of the free foreign exchange market. The proof has 3
parts. First, since the nominal interest rate in country f is higher than the
nominal interest rate in country h, currency liquidity services in country f
are higher than in country h. Second, the competition between the national
currencies and the global currency yields upper bounds on the risk-adjusted
return of the global currency. The bound is sharper, if the nominal interest
rate is higher, i.e. in country f , and it binds, if the global currency is adopted.
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Third, by free foreign exchange markets and the no arbitrage condition, the
risk-adjusted return on the global currency has to be equal in countries h and
f . As a consequence, the country with the weaker constraint on that return
does not adopt the global currency.
The proposition shows, that there is an escape hatch indeed, but only
to one side. Starting from an equilibrium in which the global currency is
used in both countries, by lowering the risk-free interest rate in currency h
below that in currency f , the central bank in country h lowers the opportunity
costs of holding the domestic currency and thus makes it more attractive than
the global currency as a means of payment, crowding out global currency in
country h.
This escape hatch is not particularly attractive, however. Nominal interest
rates can only be lowered to zero. Furthermore, a rat race between the two
central banks may then eventually force both to stick at the zero lower bound
forever or at quite low interest rates.5 Some may applaud this as the ultimate
and global implementation of the Friedman rule, while others may fear defla-
tionary spirals and macroeconomic damages. Either way, these surely would
also count as dramatic consequences of the presence of a global currency.
What can force central banks to lower interest rates rather than raise them
is the risk of entering in unknown territories in which their currency is aban-
doned as mean of exchange in favor of the global currency. These worries can
limit in a significant way the room of manoeuvering of the central bank in
stabilizing economy. The next Proposition depicts a case in which the global
currency is used in country f and spreads to country h when its central bank
raises rates above the foreign ones.
Proposition 4.4 (Losing medium-of-exchange property)
In a stochastic economy, assume liquidity immediacy, complete markets, and
the global currency being used in country f , i.e. equation (12) holding with
5In a one-country model Benigno (2019) has shown that if the central bank keeps the
inflation target below the growth rate of private currency, then it can maintain the monopoly
power as medium of exchange. However, cryptocurrencies' issuance is in general engineered
with quite low, or zero, growth rates so that inflation targets set by central banks should be
close to zero or below.
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equality. If the central bank in country h sets it > i
∗
t , then currency h is aban-
doned in country h and the global currency takes over (currency substitution).
Currency h would also be abandoned in country h if the central bank sets
it = i
∗
t and only currency g is used in country f .
Proof. [Proposition 4.4] Proof in Appendix A.
4.2 Global currency pricing
We now collect results on the stochastic process driving the global currency.
Conclusions depend on which currency is adopted for liquidity services and in
which country.
Proposition 4.5 (Global currency's stochastic process based on usage)
In a stochastic economy, under the assumption of liquidity immediacy, com-
plete markets, and the global currency being valued.
i) If both the global currency and currency h (f) are used in country h (f),
equations (9) ((12)) and (8) ((11)) hold with equality, then the global
currency's exchange rate in units of currency h (f) follows a martingale
in the country-h (f) risk-adjusted measure
E˜t [Qt+1] = Qt, (E˜
∗
t
[
Q∗t+1
]
= Q∗t ). (19)
ii) If in country h (f), the only currency used is currency h (f), then the
global currency's exchange rate in units of currency h (f) follows a su-
permartingale in the country-h (f) risk-adjusted measure
E˜t [Qt+1] < Qt (E˜
∗
t
[
Q∗t+1
]
< Q∗t ). (20)
iii) If in country h (f), the only currency used is the global currency, then
the global currency's exchange rate in units of currency h (f) follows a
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submartingale in the country-h (f) risk-adjusted measure
E˜t [Qt+1] > Qt (E˜
∗
t
[
Q∗t+1
]
> Q∗t ). (21)
Proof. Proof in Appendix A.
Note, part (i) of Proposition 4.1 is similar to the fundamental pricing equa-
tion in Schilling and Uhlig (2018).
5 Benchmark: no global currency
It is helpful to compare the result of Proposition 4.1 to those that would
obtain without a global currency. In the latter case, the competition between
domestic bond and money implies the relationship between interest rate and
liquidity premia as shown in equations (10) and (13), for country h and f ,
respectively. The competition, instead, between the two nominal one-period
bonds denominated in currency h and f together with completeness of markets
yields uncovered interest parity:
Et
[
Mt+1St+1
St
]
=
1 + it
1 + i∗t
, (22)
which can be also written using country-h risk-adjusted expectation as
E˜t [St+1]
St
=
1 + it
1 + i∗t
. (23)
Lacking the competition induced by the global currency, there is nothing
that ex-ante restricts liquidity premia across countries and synchronizes in-
terest rates. Monetary policymakers are free to choose their policies and the
exchange-rate regime. The interest rate can be set to react to macroeconomic
variables, and the exchange rate is let to float. Alternatively, one of the two
countries can even decide to fix or manage the exchange rate but in this case it
has to relinquish its independence in setting monetary policy, as the Impossible
Trinity would say. Competition from a global currency makes this trinity even
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harder to reconcile. As discussed in the previous section, one should expect
more synchronization of policies or a pressure to set rates low in order to keep
medium-of- exchange properties for government currencies.
6 Special case: asset-backed global currencies
This section is motivated by the recent announcement that Facebook is going
to launch a new global currency, Libra. The main characteristic of Libra that
we are going to investigate is its backing through a basket of risk-free securities
denominated in government currencies. In our framework, suppose that the
consortium issuing the global currency backs it by safe bonds denominated in
currency h. Moreover, assume that the consortium is ready to buy and sell any
amount of the global currency at a fixed price Qt. When issuing the amount
∆t of the global currency at some date t, the consortium invests the proceeds
∆tQt in the safe bonds of country h. In period t+ 1, the consortium receives
the interest payments on the bonds. The consortium keeps a portion of the
date t + 1 portfolio value as a per-period asset management fee, assumed to
be φt∆tQt for some φt ≥ 0 set in t. One may wish to think of these fees as
profits paid to the shareholders of the consortium.
The consortium then sets the new price Qt+1, again trading any amount
of global currency at that price and investing their client's funds in home safe
bonds. The bond returns after management fee which accrues between t and
t+ 1 to the global currency investors can be redeemed at the global currency's
price Qt+1 or are reinvested.
In order to credibly promise the repurchase of the global currency for Qt+1
at t+ 1 and assuming no profits beyond the asset management fee, assets and
liabilities have to grow at the same rate,
Qt+1 = (1 + it − φt)Qt (24)
Note that for it ≥ φt the price of the global currency then increases over time
Qt+1 ≥ Qt.
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Proposition 6.1 (Asset backed global currency)
Assume the global currency is valued.
(i) If φt < it, then currency h is crowded out and only the global currency is
used in country h. Moreover, Lt =
φt
1+it
.
(ii)If φt = it, both the currency h and the global currency coexist in country h.
(iii) If φt > it, then only currency h is used in country h.
Proof. Proof in Appendix A.
From the results in proposition 6.1, we can retrieve more striking implica-
tions if we assume the fee to take the form of a fixed portion of the interest
payments, φt = κit for some parameter 0 ≤ κ ≤ 1. Then
1. If κ < 1, then it ≤ φt only holds for it = 0. Moreover, it = 0 implies
φt = 0 and the global currency is used together with the local currency
in country h.
2. If κ = 1 (or φt = it), then the price Qt for the global currency is fixed
(Stablecoin) and both currencies are used.
A useful reading of the above results from a central-banking perspective
is the following. For the local currency h to maintain usage, the nominal
interest rate has to undercut or match the management fee φ. The proposition
therefore suggests that an interesting Bertrand-type game could unfold. The
home central bank may seek to undercut the fee charged by the consortium, in
order to drive the global currency out of usage at home. But without usage, the
global currency consortium could not earn any revenue from the fees: it would
be better off and might in turn respond by lowering its fees in response6. In
the limit, this dynamic could result in both parties ratcheting down the price
for its currencies to their marginal costs of issuance. If these marginal costs
are zero or near zero, an assumption often made in the literature, one obtains
a zero interest rate policy and a zero fee in the limit. Put differently, the
6The consortium may not care, if country h is small. It presumably would care, though,
if this is a large and economically important country or a large and important currency
union.
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currency competition between the currency h and the global currency leads to
the establishment of the celebrated Friedman rule to keep interest rates at zero,
thereby setting the private costs of holding the currencies equal to the social
cost of producing it. There is a large literature establishing conditions under
which the Friedman rule is optimal, see Woodford (1990). More generally,
if one currency has higher marginal costs of production than the other, then
the resulting zero profit condition for this higher-cost currency will dictate the
resulting limit.
These results are also reminiscent of view in Hayek (1978), that unfettered
competition can align private incentives with social objectives. To extract
rents from liquidity services, currency issuers have to supply a better money
than others, by keeping its value high and therefore inflation low. But then
competition kicks in to eradicate rents to zero and eliminate liquidity pre-
mia, so that the better money serves also the social benefits. Benigno (2019)
presents a model of currency competition obtaining the same result under
free entry. Our insights are related to the analysis in Marimon et al. (2003),
who likewise emphasize that cheap inside monies place tight upper bounds on
inflation rates there or nominal interest rates here.
In a nutshell, Libra may push central banks back to the zero lower bound.
In essence, an asset backed global currency employs bonds to finance liquidity
services, thus combining both the advantages of the liquidity services of money
with the interest payments of bonds. Using the home currency can now not
be more costly than the asset management fee charged by the consortium.
7 Examples
In the previous sections, we have presented our results using a general frame-
work with a generic notation for the stochastic discount factors and the liq-
uidity services. We now provide several examples of models which put more
structure on preferences and constraints. We consider three different models:
1) a money-in-utility function model; 2) a cash-in-advance-constraint model
in which the credit market opens before the cash market; 3) a cash-in-
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advance-constraint model in which the cash market opens before the credit
market. The first two models can be casted in the framework of Section 3 in
which liquidity services are received at the same time money is held in agents'
portfolio. Model 3) deals with the case of delayed liquidity services, which is
discussed in its more general form in Appendix refsec:delay.
7.1 Money-in-the-utility-function model
The model follows the Sidrauski-Brock framework extended to allow for mul-
tiple currencies. Consumers in Home country have preferences of the form
Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0
{
U(Ct) + V
(
Mtoth,t
Pt
)}
(25)
where Mtoth,t = Mh,t + QtMg,t as in equation (2), where β is the rate of time
preferences with 0 < β < 1, C is a consumption good and P its price in units
of currency h. We can also assume more generally that C represents a bundle
of goods. Consumers get utility from consumption, through a concave function
U(·) strictly increasing in C and from real money balances by holding currency
h, Mh, and the global currency Mg. The utility V (·) is weakly increasing in
real money balances but may exhibit a satiation point at a finite level of real
money balances; Qt is the price of the global currency in units of currency h.
Consistently with the general framework of Section 3, consumers can invest
in four securities: i) a risk-free bond denominated in currency h, Bh, paying
an interest rate i; ii) a risk-free bond denominated in currency f , Bf , paying
an interest rate i∗; iii) money in units of currency h, Mf , and iv) the global
money, Mg. Consumers can also trade in a set of state-contingent securities
able to span all states of nature. We omit them from the presentation of
the budget constraint of the consumer. The nominal exchange rate between
currency h and f is denoted by S, as in the main text; let T denote lump-sum
transfers received from the government in units of currency h while Tg are
transfers from the issuer of global money in units of global currency. Finally,
Y is the home endowment of good C. Preferences in country f are specular,
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with appropriate starred variables. Consumers are subject to the following
budget constraints
Bh,t + StBf,t +Mh,t +QtMg,t = Wt + Pt(Yt − Ct) + Tt +QtTg,t,
in which
Wt ≡Mh,t−1 +QtMg,t−1 + (1 + it−1)Bh,t−1 + (1 + i∗t−1)StBf,t−1.
In the preferences (25) domestic and global money are perfect substitutes.
While we shall allow short sales of bonds, as in the main text, we impose a
short-sale constraint on the global currency and currency h, i.e. Mg ≥ 0 and
Mh ≥ 0. The first-order conditions with respect to Bh, Bf , Mh, Mg are
UC(Ct)
Pt
1
1 + it
= Et
{
β
UC(Ct+1)
Pt+1
}
UC(Ct)
Pt
1
1 + i∗t
= Et
{
β
UC(Ct+1)
Pt+1
St+1
St
}
UC(Ct)
Pt
≥ 1
Pt
Vm
(
Mtoth,t
Pt
)
+ Et
{
β
UC(Ct+1)
Pt+1
}
QtUC(Ct)
Pt
≥ Qt
Pt
Vm
(
Mtoth,t
Pt
)
+ Et
{
β
Qt+1UC(Ct+1)
Pt+1
}
,
with the last two equations holding with equality for an interior solution in
which Mh ≥ 0 and MG ≥ 0, respectively. As in main text, at least one should
hold with equality. In the above conditions, UC(·) and Vm(·) are the derivatives
of the respective functions with respect to their argument.
These equations can be casted in the notation of Section 3 by noting that
the stochastic discount factors are
Mt+1 = βUC(Ct+1)
UC(Ct)
Pt
Pt+1
M∗t+1 = β
UC(C
∗
t+1)
UC(C∗t )
P ∗t
P ∗t+1
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and the liquidity premia are
Lt =
Vm
(
Mtoth,t
Pt
)
UC(Ct)
L∗t =
Vm
(
Mtot,∗f,t
P ∗t
)
UC(C∗t )
,
whereMtot,∗f,t = M
∗
f,t+Q
∗
tM
∗
g,t, analogously to (2). Note that complete markets
imply that
UC(Ct)
Pt
= k
UC(C
∗
t )
StP ∗t
for some positive parameter k which can be set equal to one. In the case
purchasing power parity holds, Pt = StP
∗
t , marginal utilities of consumption
are proportional across countries. When all currencies are used, Proposition
4.1 applies and therefore Lt = L
∗
t . Another implication is that the marginal
utilities of real money balances Vm(·) are equalized across countries.
7.2 Cash-in-advance model, type I
Consider a cash-in-advance model with the timing of Lucas and Stokey (1987),
in which the credit market opens before the cash market. Consumers living
in country h have the following preferences
Et0
∞∑
t=t0
βt−t0U(CT,t, CN,t) (26)
in which CT and CN are, respectively, a traded and non-traded good and
β, with 0 < β < 1 is the intertemporal discount factor; U(·, ·) is a concave
function, strictly increasing in both arguments. Preferences in country f are
similar with variables denoted by a star.
Each period is divided in two sub-periods. In the first sub-period financial
markets are open and consumer's budget constraint is given
Bh,t + StBf,t +Mh,t +QtMg,t = Wt + Tt +QtTg,t (27)
24
in which Wt is the nominal wealth, which remains after taking into account
the purchases of goods in the previous period
Wt = (1 + it−1)Bh,t−1 + (1 + i∗t−1)StBf,t−1 +Mh,t−1 +QtMg,t−1 + (28)
+PT,t−1(YT,t−1 − CT,t−1) + PN,t−1(YN,t−1 − CN,t−1).
YT and YN are the endowments of the traded and non-traded goods, and
PT and PN the respective prices. In the second subperiod of period t, the
cash market opens and non-traded goods can be purchased following this
constraint
Mtoth,t ≥ PN,tCN,t. (29)
where Mtoth,t = Mh,t + QtMg,t as in equation (2). Budget constraints can be
written specularly for the consumers living in country f .
The first-order conditions with respect to Bh, Bf , Mh, Mg are
λt
1 + it
= Et {βλt+1} (30)
λt
1 + i∗t
= Et
{
βλt+1
St+1
St
}
(31)
λt ≥ µt + βEt {λt+1} (32)
λtQt ≥ µtQt + βEt {λt+1Qt+1} (33)
with the last two equations holding with equality for an interior solutionMh,t >
0 and Mg,t > 0, respectively; λt and µt are the multipliers associated with the
constraints (27) and (29), respectively. Moreover the first-order conditions
with respect to CN and CT implies that
UCN (CT,t, CN,t)
PN,t
= µt + βEt {λt+1} , (34)
UCT (CT,t, CN,t)
PT,t
= βEt {λt+1} , (35)
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where UCT (·, ·) and UCN (·, ·) are the derivatives of the function U(·, ·) with
respect to the first and second arguments, respectively. We can now map this
model in the notation of the general framework of Section 3, by noting that
the stochastic discount factors are given by
Mt+1 = βλt+1
λt
M∗t+1 =
βλ∗t+1
λ∗t
while the liquidity premia can be written instead as
Lt =
µt
λt
L∗t =
µ∗t
λ∗t
.
Using the first-order conditions (32), (34) and (35), we can also write the
nominal stochastic discount factors
Mt+1 = βUCN (CT,t+1, CN,t+1)
UCN (CT,t, CN,t)
PN,t
PN,t+1
M∗t+1 = β
UCN (C
∗
T,t+1, C
∗
N,t+1)
UCN (C
∗
T,t, C
∗
N,t)
P ∗N,t
P ∗N,t+1
and the liquidity premia as
Lt =
UCN (CT,t, CN,t)− PN,tPT,tUCT (CT,t, CN,t)
UCN (CT,t,CN,t)
L∗t =
UCN (C
∗
T,t, C
∗
N,t)− PN,tPT,tUCT (C∗T,t, C∗N,t)
UCN (C
∗
T,t,C
∗
N,t)
.
The results of Proposition 4.1 applies in the case all currencies are used.
Additional results can be derived in this particular example. Note first that
complete market implies that λt = κλ
∗
t for some positive constant κ and at all
t, which in the context of the above model can be also written as
UCN (CT,t, YN,t)
PN,t
= k
UCN (C
∗
T,t, Y
∗
N,t)
StP ∗N,t
. (36)
Under appropriate conditions on the initial distribution of wealth, the constant
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k can be set equal to 1.7 In (36), we have substituted equilibrium in the non-
traded goods market, CN,t = YN,t and C
∗
N,t = Y
∗
N,t. Moreover, combining the
first-order conditions (30), (32), (34) and (35) it is possible to obtain that
UCN (CT,t, YN,t)
UCT (CT,t, YN,t)
= (1 + it)
PN,t
PT,t
UCN (C
∗
T,t, Y
∗
N,t)
UCT (C
∗
T,t, Y
∗
N,t)
= (1 + i∗t )
P ∗N,t
P ∗T,t
,
Using it = i
∗
t and (36) with k = 1 in the above conditions, we obtain that
UCT (CT,t, YN,t)
UCT (C
∗
T,t, Y
∗
N,t)
=
PT,t
StP ∗T,t
. (37)
Assume that the law-of-one price holds for traded goods, then PT,t = StP
∗
T,t,
and consider the special case in which YN,t = Y
∗
N,t, then (37) implies perfect
cross-country risk-sharing of the consumption of traded goods, CT,t = C
∗
T,t.
Using this result in (36), we also obtain that the law-of-one price holds for
non-traded goods PN,t = StP
∗
N,t, for which it is key the equalization of the
nominal interest rates.
7.3 Cash-in-advance model, type II
Consider a cash-in-advance model with a different timing, in which the cash
market now opens before the credit market. Preferences of consumers living
in country h are similar to (26). Each period is divided in two sub-periods.
In the first sub-period the non-traded good can be purchased subject to the
following constraint
Mh,t−1 +QtMg,t−1 ≥ PN,tCN,t (38)
in which variables follow previous definitions. After the cash market closes,
in the second sub-period of period t the credit market opens and consumers
7The result that λt = κλ
∗
t implies (36) depends on the fact that money allows to insure
any movement in the price of non-traded good in the cash constraint (29).
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are subject to the following constraint
Bh,t + StBf,t +Mh,t +QtMg,t + PT,tCT,t + PN,tCN,t =
+PT,tYT,t + PN,tYN,t + Tt +QtTg,t +Wt (39)
where
Wt ≡ (1 + it−1)Bh,t−1 + (1 + i∗t−1)StBf,t−1 +Mh,t−1 +QtMg,t−1.
Budget constraints can be specularly written for the consumers in country
f .
The first-order conditions with respect to Bh, Bf , Mh, Mg are
λt
1 + it
= Et {βλt+1}
λt
1 + i∗t
= Et
{
βλt+1
St+1
St
}
λt ≥ βEt {µt+1 + λt+1}
λtQt ≥ βEt {(µt+1 + λt+1)Qt+1}
with the last two equations holding with equality for an interior solution
Mh,t > 0 and Mg,t > 0, respectively. In the above conditions, λt and µt
are the multipliers associated with the constraints (39) and (38), respectively.
Moreover the first-order conditions with respect to CN and CT implies that
UCN (CT,t, CN,t)
PN,t
= µt + λt, (40)
UCT (CT,t, CN,t)
PT,t
= λt. (41)
Note that in this model liquidity premia are received with one-period de-
lay. Therefore this example can be mapped in the notation of the general
framework presented in Appendix B.1, by noting that the stochastic discount
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factors are given by
Mt+1 = βλt+1
λt
M∗t+1 =
βλ∗t+1
λ∗t
while liquidity premia are
Lt+1 =
µt+1
λt+1
L∗t+1 =
µ∗t+1
λ∗t+1
.
Using the first-order conditions (40) and (41), we can further write the
stochastic discount factors and the liquidity premia as
Mt+1 = βUCT (CT,t+1, CN,t+1)
UCT (CT,t, CN,t)
PT,t
PT,t+1
M∗t+1 = β
UCT (C
∗
T,t+1, C
∗
N,t+1)
UCT (C
∗
T,t, C
∗
N,t)
P ∗T,t
P ∗T,t+1
and
1 + Lt+1 =
UCN (CT,t+1, CN,t+1)
UCT (CT,t+1, CN,t+1)
PT,t+1
PN,t+1
1 + L∗t+1 =
UCN (C
∗
T,t+1, C
∗
N,t+1)
UCT (C
∗
T,t+1, C
∗
N,t+1)
P ∗T,t+1
P ∗N,t+1
.
The results of Proposition B.1 and Corollary B.1 apply to this model.
8 Conclusion
Starting from a general framework, we have analyzed a two-country economy
featuring a home, a foreign and a global (crypto)currency. For the benchmark
case that markets are complete, that the global currency is used in both coun-
tries and that currency liquidity services are immediate, we have shown that
nominal interest rates must be equal and that the exchange rate between the
home and the foreign currency is a risk- adjusted martingale. We call this
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phenomenon Crypto-Enforced Monetary Policy Synchronization (CEMPS). It
adds a further restriction to the classic Impossible Trinity. We have discussed
the dangers for monetary policies, seeking to escape this restriction. We have
characterized the implications for the exchange rate dynamics and the pricing
dynamics of the global currency. If the global currency is backed by interest-
bearing assets, additional and tight restrictions on monetary policy arise. We
demonstrate, how our general framework encompasses a number of classic
monetary models in the literature such as money-in-the-utility function and
cash-in-advance. In the appendix, we have extended our results to the case of
delayed liquidity services, where additional correlation terms arise, and when
currencies are not perfect substitutes.
We conclude that the introduction of a globally used currency may there-
fore substantially change the landscape of international monetary policy. We
leave to future research to further investigate how the dominant role of tradi-
tional currencies as safe assets in international markets will be challenged by
the presence of global crypto currencies.
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APPENDIX
A Proofs of Propositions
In this Appendix, we collect the proofs of the Propositions.
A.1 Proof of Proposition 4.2
Proof. [Proposition 4.2] Let K > −1 arbitrary, e.g. K = 0. From (17), and
again using the definition of the covariance,
0 = covt
(
Mt+1, St+1
St
)
+ Et[Mt+1] Et
[
St+1
St
− 1
]
. (A.1)
Solving for E[St+1/St],
E
[
St+1
St
]
= 1 +
covt(Mt+1, St+1St )
Et[Mt+1] = 1 + (1 + it) covt
(
Mt+1, St+1
St
)
. (A.2)
In what follows, define σt|M the conditional standard deviation of the nominal
stochastic discount factor, σt|S the conditional standard deviation of the nom-
inal exchange rate between home and foreign, and ρ(Mt+1,St+1) the correlation
coefficient between the two. Then, the likelihood that the percentage change
i
of the exchange rate exceeds K is bounded from above by
Pt
(
St+1
St
− 1 > K
)
≤ Et[
St+1
St
]
K + 1
=
1− (1 + it) covt(Mt+1, St+1St )
K + 1
=
1− (1 + it) ρt(Mt+1, St+1St )σt|M σt|S
K + 1
≤ 1 + (1 + it)σt|M σt|S
K + 1
→ 0 as K →∞
where the first inequality holds by the conditional Markov inequality, the fol-
lowing equality holds by (A.2), the consecutive equality holds by definition
of the correlation coefficient and the inequality thereafter holds since always
ρ ∈ [−1, 1] and since standard deviations are positive.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 4.3
Proof. [Proposition 4.3] It holds
Et
[
Mt+1Qt+1
Qt
]
= Et
[
M∗t+1
Q∗t+1
Q∗t
]
(A.3)
≤ Et[M∗t+1] =
1
1 + i∗t
(A.4)
<
1
1 + it
= Et[Mt+1] = 1− Lt (A.5)
The first step follows by market completeness, the second step holds since
the global currency may or may not be in use in country f , by this yielding a
weakly lower return than currency f in country f . The third step uses equation
(7). The fourth step, the inequality sign, is implied by the assumption it < i
∗
t ,
the fifth step uses equation (6) and the final step follows from the assumption
that currency h is used in country h, i.e. equation (8) with the equality sign.
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Thus,
Et
[
Mt+1Qt+1
Qt
]
< 1− Lt (A.6)
and the global currency is not used in country h. Further, we directly see
Lt < L
∗
t from our derivation. Thus, by market completeness
Et
[
Mt+1St+1
St
]
= Et[M∗t+1] < Et[Mt+1] (A.7)
where the last step follows from the derivation above. Therefore, St follows a
supermartingale in country-h risk-adjusted measure. Vice versa,
Et[M∗t+1] < Et[Mt+1] = Et
[
M∗t+1
St
St+1
]
(A.8)
Thus, with S∗ = 1/S, Et[M∗t+1] < Et
[
M∗t+1 S
∗
t+1
S∗t
]
and also the exchange rate
from the perspective of country f follows a submartingale.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 4.4
Proof. [Proposition 4.4] We have
Et[Mt+1] = 1
1 + it
<
1
1 + i∗t
= Et[M∗t+1] (A.9)
≤ 1− L∗t = Et
[
M∗t+1
Q∗t+1
Q∗t
]
(A.10)
= Et
[
Mt+1Qt+1
Qt
]
≤ 1− Lt (A.11)
Here the first step uses equation (6), the second step uses the policy set in
the two countries, it ≥ i∗t , the third step equation (7). The fourth step and
inequality follows because currency f may or may not be used in country f .
The fifth step uses that the global currency is used in country f , the sixth step
uses completeness of markets and the last step uses that the global currency
may or may not be adopted in country h. Altogether, Et[Mt+1] < 1− Lt for
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i > i∗. Alternatively, Et[Mt+1] < 1−Lt for i = i∗ if currency f is not used in
country f , Et[M∗t+1] < 1− L∗t .
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4.5
Proof. [Proposition 4.5] (1) Assume in country h that the global currency and
currency h are used. Then
Et
[
Mt+1Qt+1
Qt
]
= 1− Lt = Et[Mt+1] (A.12)
Multiplication by Qt/Et[Mt+1] yields the result.
(2) Assume in country h that currency h is used and the global currency is
not used then we have
Et
[
Mt+1Qt+1
Qt
]
< 1− Lt = Et[Mt+1] (A.13)
As before, multiplication by Qt/Et[Mt+1] yields the result. The parallel result
for country f follows similar steps, as well as case (3).
A.5 Proof of Proposition 6.1
Proof. [Proposition 6.1] (i) Assume φt < it. Then
1− Lt ≥ Et
[
Mt+1Qt+1
Qt
]
= (1 + it − φt)Et[Mt+1] > Et[Mt+1]. (A.14)
The first inequality holds by (9), the second step holds by (24), the third step
follows from it > φt. Since 1 − Lt > Et[Mt+1], the local currency h is not
used. Given the assumption that at least one currency is used in country h,
(9) has to hold with equality, 1− Lt = (1 + it − φt)Et [Mt+1], and the global
currency is used in h. By no arbitrage, a comparison between the return on
the global currency and the bond through (6) yields
1− Lt
1 + it − φt =
1
1 + it
(A.15)
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and thus Lt =
φt
1+it
.
(ii) Assume φt = it, then
1− Lt ≥ Et
[
Mt+1Qt+1
Qt
]
= (1 + it − φt)Et[Mt+1] = Et[Mt+1] (A.16)
and since at least one currency has to be in use, we have
1− Lt = Et
[
Mt+1Qt+1
Qt
]
= Et[Mt+1] (A.17)
implying that both currencies are used.
(iii) Assume φt > it, then
1− Lt ≥ Et[Mt+1] > (1 + it − φt)Et[Mt+1] = Et
[
Mt+1Qt+1
Qt
]
(A.18)
Thus, the global currency is not used. But since once currency has to be used,
it has to be currency h, 1− Lt = Et[Mt+1].
B Robustness analysis
In this section, we present some robustness analysis of our main results. First,
we investigate the case in which liquidity services are delayed one period with
respect to when money is held in the agents' portfolio. Second, we sketch out
the implications of imperfect substitutability between monies.
B.1 Delayed liquidity services
An important assumption of our framework is liquidity immediacy, i.e. that the
liquidity services provided by currency occur at the same date t that money is
added to the portfolio of agents. However, some models, like the third example
in Section 7, instead postulate liquidity premia to be received a period after
portfolio choices are made, i.e. with delay in t+ 1:
Assumption B.1 (Liquidity delay). The purchase of the global currency and
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currency h in country h at t yields delayed liquidity premia Lt+1 receivable in
t + 1. Analogously, the time t purchase of global currency and currency f in
country f at t yields delayed liquidity premia L∗t+1 receivable in t+ 1.
In this case, equations (8), (9) and (10) need to be replaced with
1 ≥ Et[Mt+1(1 + Lt+1)], (B.19)
Qt ≥ Et[Mt+1(1 + Lt+1)Qt+1], (B.20)
it
1 + it
≥ Et[Mt+1Lt+1]. (B.21)
The liquidity premia are appropriately discounted by the stochastic discount
factor. Since we will focus on equilibria in which all currencies are used, we
set (B.19), (B.20), (B.21) with an equality sign.
In country f , one must likewise replace (11), (12) and (13) with
1 ≥ Et[M∗t+1(1 + L∗t+1)], (B.22)
Q∗t ≥ Et[M∗t+1(1 + L∗t+1)Q∗t+1], (B.23)
i∗t
1 + i∗t
≥ Et[M∗t+1L∗t+1]. (B.24)
And again in what follows, we are going to assume that the above equations
hold with an equality sign. Define the conditional covariance under the home
country risk-adjusted measure as
c˜ovt(X, Y ) ≡ E˜t[XY ]− E˜t[X] E˜t[Y ] (B.25)
For a random variable X, define the risk-adjusted expectation in country f as
the equivalent to E˜t[·] via
E˜∗t [X] ≡
Et[M∗t+1X]
Et[M∗t+1]
(B.26)
Let
∆t ≡ it − i∗t
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be the differences between the nominal interest rates. Maintaining all other
assumptions, we now turn to derive the implications for the exchange rate.
The next results apply in general independently of whether liquidity premia
are or are not delayed, and they just need as input the interest rate differential,
like in (B.29).
Proposition B.1 (Delayed Liquidity Services and Exchange Rates)
In a stochastic economy, assuming liquidity delay, complete markets, all cur-
rencies being used, the expected liquidity services differences and exchange rates
then satisfy
∆t = E˜t[Lt+1]− E˜∗t
[
L∗t+1
]
(B.27)
and
E˜t [St+1]
St
= 1 +
∆t
1 + i∗t
(B.28)
This corollary is a consequence strictly of the given interest differential:
the presence of the global currency is not necessary to establish these conse-
quences. Note how the results here are adjusted relative to the expressions in
our benchmark result. The (expected) liquidity services now differ by the in-
terest rate differential. If that is zero as in the main result, so is the (expected)
liquidity service difference. The exchange rate is no longer a risk-adjusted mar-
tingale: instead, there is an adjustment term that depends on the interest rate
differential. If that interest rate differential is zero as in the main result, we
are back to the risk-adjusted martingale.
Proof. [ Proposition B.1 ] Note that (B.19) and (B.21) can be written as
it = E˜t[Lt+1]
Likewise, (B.22) and (B.24) can be written as
i∗t = E˜
∗
t [L
∗
t+1]
The combination yields (B.27). Finally, consider the uncovered-interest-parity
relationship (23) to obtain (B.28).
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Corollary B.1 (Stochastic Economy under Delayed Liquidity Premia)
In a stochastic economy, assuming liquidity delay, complete markets, and all
currencies being used, the nominal interest rate differential satisfies
i∗t − it =
c˜ovt(Lt+1 − L∗t+1, Qt+1)
E˜t[Qt+1]
+
c˜ovt(L
∗
t+1, St+1)
E˜t[St+1]
(B.29)
Note that the benchmark result of interest rate equality in case of liquidity
immediacy is a direct consequence of (B.29), since the conditional covariance
terms must be zero, if Lt+1 and L
∗
t+1 are known in t. In the general case,
nonzero covariance terms arise and equation (B.29) informs us, in which di-
rection one needs to adjust the interest differential.
Proof. [ Corollary B.1.] Since all currencies are used, (B.21) and (B.24)
hold with equality. With (6) and (7), rewrite (B.21) and (B.24) using the
risk-adjusted measures as
it = E˜t [Lt+1] (B.30)
and
i∗t = E˜
∗
t [Lt+1] =
E˜t
[
L∗t+1St+1
]
E˜t [St+1]
(B.31)
where in the latter we have also used the assumption of complete markets.
Combining the two equations above, we can write the interest-rate differential
as
i∗t − it = E˜t
[
L∗t+1
]− E˜t [Lt+1] + c˜ovt(L∗t+1, St+1)
E˜t[St+1]
, (B.32)
Note that this equation holds, regardless of whether there is a global currency
or not. The presence of the global currency, however, delivers a restriction
on the difference between the expected liquidity services. Use (B.23) together
with the assumption of complete markets and the equivalence Qt = StQ
∗
t to
obtain
Qt = Et[Mt+1(1 + L∗t+1)Qt+1] (B.33)
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This can be written under the risk-adjusted measure as
(1 + it)Qt = E˜t
[
(1 + L∗t+1)Qt+1
]
. (B.34)
Also write (B.20) using the risk-adjusted measure
(1 + it)Qt = E˜t [(1 + Lt+1)Qt+1] , (B.35)
and compare it with the equation above to obtain that
0 = E˜t
[
(L∗t+1 − Lt+1)Qt+1
]
(B.36)
and thus
E˜t
[
L∗t+1
]− E˜t [Lt+1] = c˜ovt(Lt+1 − L∗t+1, Qt+1)
E˜t[Qt+1]
, (B.37)
Plug (B.37) into (B.32) to deliver (B.29).
Note that equation (B.37) determines the expected difference in the liquid-
ity premia, by which we can retrieve the result of the benchmark case of equal
liquidity premia when Lt+1 and L
∗
t+1 are known at time t.
C Imperfect substitutability of currencies
Our analysis easily generalizes with suitable modification to the situation,
where the currencies are not perfect substitutes. As in section 2, let Mtoth,t
denote the total money holding in country h at time t, expressed in units of
the domestic currency. In section 2 and implicitly in the general framework of
section 3, we have assumed that Mtoth,t is the sum of the nominal value of the
home currency as well as the global currency used at home,
Mtoth,t = Mh,t +QtMg,t, (C.38)
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see equation 2. More generally, assume that
Mtoth,t = f(Mh,t, QtMg,t) (C.39)
for some constant returns to scale function f(·, ·). This captures the idea that
the national currency may be relatively more useful for certain transactions,
while the global currency is more useful for others. A fully spelled out version
of this idea is in Schilling and Uhlig (2019). Due to constant returns to scale,
(C.39) can alternatively written in terms of real units as
Mtoth,t
Pt
= f
(
Mh,t
Pt
,
QtMg,t
Pt
)
(C.40)
Equation (C.38) arises for the linear specification
f(Mh,t, QtMg,t) = Mh,t +QtMg,t
Total home money holdings provide the total liquidity services LtM
tot
ht . Via
(C.39), a marginal unit of home currency therefore provides liquidity ser-
vices Ltf1,t, while a marginal unit of global currency provides liquidity ser-
vices Ltf2,tQt, where f1,t and f2,t are the partial derivatives of the function f
with respect to their first and second argument, evaluated at (Mh,t, QtMg,t).
Equations (8) and (9) now become
1 ≥ Ltf1,t + Et[Mt+1] (C.41)
and
1 ≥ Ltf2,t + Et
[
Mt+1Qt+1
Qt
]
(C.42)
These equations and the usual properties of constant-returns-to-scale functions
make clear, that the marginal liquidity services Ltf1,t and Ltf2,t provided by
x
either currency now depend on the ratio8 of their nominal values
ρt =
QtMg,t
Mh,t
(C.43)
Propositions 4.1, 4.3 and 4.4 require appropriate modification. If f is not
linear, then it < i
∗
t generally results in a tilt towards home currency and
decrease in ρt rather than a complete elimination of the global currency, though
the latter is still a possibility, if f2(· · · , 0) < ∞, i.e. if the two currencies are
substitutes, and the interest rate difference i∗t−it is sufficiently large. Likewise,
it > i
∗ generally results in a tilt towards the global currency and increase in
ρt, rather than a complete elimination of the home currency. Once again,
the latter can happen in the economically plausible case of substitutes and
f1 < ∞ as well as a sufficiently large interest rate differential it − i∗. These
considerations add nuance to the main analysis, without changing its core
message.
8For completeness and as usual, define the function g(ρ) = f(1, ρ). Note that Mtoth,t =
g(ρt)Mh,t. Calculate that f1,t = g(ρt)− g′(ρt)ρt and f2,t = g′(ρt).
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